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Tax Law within the Larger Legal System
J. SCOTT WILKIE* & PETER W. HOGG**
Tax law may be viewed as occupying its own universe, even though tax funds the implemen-
tation of public policies that animate Canadian society. This article reminds us that tax law 
must respond to basic rule-of-law norms in spite of overarching and well-meaning policy 
goals. It adopts reference points featured in recent cases. One is the Charter, which limits 
penalties that can be imposed on non-compliant taxpayers and tax advisers without adhering 
to due process safeguards. Another is the impact of international arrangements among 
countries in a global business environment to guide consistent regulatory responses and to 
identify and share information. No matter how seemingly efficient or well-grounded, interna-
tional norms still need to be safely grounded in Parliamentary authority to be enforceable in 
relation to Canadian taxpayers. All practitioners concerned with tax equity, neutrality, and 
efficiency should remember that tax law exists within a larger legal system and must be so 
evaluated; occasionally, it must yield to the legal principles underlying that system.
Les lois sur la fiscalité semblent occuper leur propre univers même si c’est le produit de 
la fiscalité qui permet de mettre en œuvre des politiques publiques qui animent la société 
canadienne. Cet article nous rappelle que les lois sur la fiscalité doivent obéir à des normes 
juridiques élémentaires malgré la primauté et le caractère bien intentionné des objectifs 
de ces politiques. Il adopte des balises tirées de causes récentes. L’une de ces balises est 
la Charte, qui limite les pénalités qui peuvent être imposées aux contribuables délinquants 
et à leurs conseillers fiscaux en l’absence des garanties de l’application régulière de la loi. 
Une autre est la capacité des ententes commerciales internationales, dans un monde des 
affaires devenu sans frontière, d’uniformiser les réglementations et d’identifier et partager 
l’information. Peu importe qu’elles paraissent efficaces et bien fondées, les normes interna-
tionales doivent malgré tout être bien enracinées dans l’autorité du Parlement pour qu’il 
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soit possible de les appliquer aux contribuables canadiens. Tous ceux qui se soucient 
d’équité fiscale, de neutralité et d’efficacité ne doivent jamais oublier que les lois sur la 
fiscalité s’inscrivent dans un système juridique plus vaste et qu’elles doivent être évaluées 
dans ce contexte. Elles doivent à l’occasion céder le passage aux principes juridiques qui 
sous-tendent ce système.
I. THE LAW’S EXPANSE
THIS ARTICLE EXPLORES SOME ASPECTS OF THE RULE OF LAW as it applies to 
Canada’s tax system. Our thinking has been both invigorated and challenged by 
the writing of Neil Brooks,1 whose contribution to tax law is the subject of the 
workshop in which this article was first presented. Our subject challenges, and is 
challenged by, the confluence of social justice and tax policy that has so interested 
Neil. However, the admirable idea that tax policy should advance social justice 
must not lose sight of the legal limits of the tax system against which much of 
Neil’s fiscally-inspired social criticism has strained and to which our comments 
are directed. We are mindful that Neil’s views on socially just tax policy in fact 
tend to be broadly consistent with our own. Even if they would diverge, however, 
ours still reflect an abiding awareness of the need to view tax policy and its 
1. See e.g. Neil Brooks, “The Responsibility of Judges in Interpreting Tax Legislation” 
in Graeme S Cooper, ed, Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law (Amsterdam: IBFD 
Publications BV, 1997) 93.
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influence on the development and application of the tax law with an eye to social 
justice, an exercise for which Neil’s thinking is both a compass and a conscience.
Tax law is one part–a very important part–of the universe of private and 
public law, constitutional and international law, all of which influence and 
sometimes control the norms of the domestic tax system. This observation 
foreshadows how the system would be protected from outcomes that Neil would 
criticize as inconsistent with the distributional and other effects that ensure 
its compatibility with normative measures of social justice. It also, however, 
implicitly captures the possibility that just outcomes–whether socially, fiscally, 
or politically just–are only achievable within the context of a legal system. It may 
be that interpretive principles advocated by Neil throughout his career would be 
pushed and pulled, even stretched, to accomplish underlying social and related 
tax policy objectives. But this flexibility would still involve interpreting the law, 
not the chaotic or capricious, even though possibly well-intentioned, imposition 
of exogenous outcomes lacking the authority supplied by law.
We explore this proposition with two reference points.
The recent case of Guindon v R,2 which we examine more closely in Part 
III(C), below, involves the confrontation of sound tax policy to regulate the 
marketing of tax shelters with the ultimate behavioural constraint, criminal 
sanctions. The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) criticized the diligence with 
which an advisor had advised on what the tax authorities evidently considered 
to be a controversial tax plan, and sought to impose very large financial penalties 
under the authority of a provision in the Income Tax Act3 (Act) targeting advisors’ 
complicity in tax shelters according to a “culpable conduct” standard.4 In that 
case, the Tax Court was moved by the law’s apparently draconian consequences to 
hold that an ostensibly civil penalty amounted to a “criminal sanction” imposed 
by the Act,5 which collided with due process rights mandated by the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms6 (Charter).
The court held, essentially, that the tax law imposes bespoke fiscal limits that 
are consistent with, indeed part of, a more expansive legal order protecting citizens 
from incursions on their personal and economic liberty by the state, through the 
expectation of rigorous, principled, and transparent processes.7 On appeal, the 
2. 2012 TCC 287, 2012 CCI 287 [Guindon, TCC].
3. RSC 1985, c 1 (5th Supp) [ITA].
4. Ibid, s 163.2.
5. Guindon, TCC, supra note 2 at paras 52-53.
6. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c 11 [Charter].
7. Guindon, TCC, supra note 2 at paras 58-59, 70.
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Federal Court of Appeal held that the penalties did not cross the constitutional 
line; they were justified by “the proper functioning of the administrative system 
of self-assessment.”8 The issue is a close one, however, and the Supreme Court 
of Canada recently heard the appeal of the Federal Court’s decision. As we write 
these comments, it has not yet issued its decision. There is no doubt that the 
integrity of the tax system requires adherence to overarching legal principles that 
are applicable to every subset of the legal system, including tax law.
Our second reference point takes us to the opposite end of the rule-of-law 
constraints, namely, the “international tax” setting, where it has become increas-
ingly common for national tax administrations to collaborate in various ways, 
even if only to be better informed about a broader range of developments. These 
developments relate to and influence recurring patterns of taxpayer behaviour 
that attempt, within the boundaries of opportunities seemingly offered by the 
law as it is commonly perceived, to plan for how income is earned or expenses are 
incurred so as to shift income, and with it tax liability, out of high-tax jurisdictions 
into more sheltered locations. Ongoing, widely known work of the Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), in collaboration 
with the G-20, is concerned with “base erosion and profit shifting” (“BEPS”). 
Scoping work in 2012 and early 2013 became the basis for a 2013 Action Plan 
to address BEPS.9 The Action Plan is the platform for a series of detailed interna-
tional tax studies essentially concerned with the compatibility of entrenched legal 
perceptions and situations in which these perceptions, and the circumstances 
they would seek to organize in the interest of containing, shaping, and funding 
social priorities, actually seem to collide.10
Increasingly, with these sorts of considerations as catalysts, tax adminis-
trations often agree on guidance of various kinds to achieve relatively uniform 
approaches to these recurring transnational problems. They form informal 
associations to share information and experience. Sometimes they adopt interna-
tionally consistent related “best practices” through participation in the activities 
of supranational organizations such as the OECD. These practices and the norms 
they project often reflect sound tax policy in a global environment–notably when 
perceived through a social justice filter. But sometimes the good works of tax 
administration may not have a solid basis in the legal rules of the Canadian tax 
system and may therefore be vulnerable to taxpayer challenge. This scenario arose 
8. 2013 FCA 153 at para 42, 360 DLR (4th) 515 [Guindon, FCA].
9. OECD, Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (2013), online: <dx.doi.org/ 
10.1787/9789264202719-en> [OECD, Action Plan].
10. Ibid.
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in Canada v GlaxoSmithKline Inc,11 with respect to the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines12 (Guidelines). We discuss this case in Part IV(B), below.
In the Guindon situation, supervening or general law polices perceived 
excesses of the tax law and its administration in the interest of a just outcome 
consistent with cognizable and uncontroversial societal standards and objectives 
that are incorporated into our constitutional law. In the case of international 
guidance, what is applied as “the law” may not be what it seems. The norms 
lack the democratic provenance of legislative (or at least authorized regulatory) 
enactment. The rule of law insists that outcomes outside the scope of the positive 
law’s reasonable contemplation cannot and should not be given effect simply 
by administrative practices, even if forcefully expressed and well motivated in a 
social and economic policy sense.
These are two examples, no doubt among many, that raise questions relevant 
to our topic, which is essentially a consideration of the rule of law in relation to 
tax matters. Despite how we may perceive the sound objectives served by the 
tax law, that law can only exist, let alone function effectively, within the legal 
system that hosts it.
II. THE TAX LAW: ITS POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS
A. WHAT LAW? WHAT PURPOSE?
There is no “common law of tax.”13 The common law never raised money for 
public purposes. Indeed, a foundational principle of our constitution is that only 
Parliament can raise taxes.14 Tax law can only be statutory, a collective expression 
by the citizenry through their legislators of the circumstances in which private 
resources may be appropriated, with legal sanction, to the “public good” or 
perhaps more precisely the collective needs of society. Indeed, there was no 
national income tax in this country until 1917, when ‘temporary’ legislation to 
provide funding for the war effort was enacted.
11. 2012 SCC 52, [2012] 3 SCR 3 [GlaxoSmithKline].
12. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations 
(2010) [OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines].
13. This statement is generally acknowledged. See e.g. Brooks, supra note 1 at 94. Of course, 
judges often have to decide cases with little guidance from the Act, but all tax decisions are 
ultimately interpretations of the Act.
14. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 2012 student ed (Toronto: Thomson 
Carswell, 2012) at 6-1.
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Tax law serves, and was introduced to achieve, very utilitarian objectives. 
It pays for public consumption–goods and services acquired and consumed by 
all citizens (ideally, by the poor more than the rich, causing some redistribution 
of unequal wealth) as elements of a decent and civilized society. Tax law also 
functions as a device to induce or subsidize economic conduct of particular kinds 
thought to be instrumental to the achievement of social and industrial policy 
objectives for the common good, such as charitable work, scientific research, and 
the propagation of small businesses as foundations for more mature and pervasive 
economic activity and resulting societal benefit.
Since tax law raises revenue for a wide variety of public purposes, it lacks 
the singular purpose that can be assigned to other branches of the law, such as 
contract, tort, or criminal law, each of which serves an important function in 
the regulation of a civilized society. Tax law serves many functions. It is always 
accessory. But accessory to what? At a technical level, it is accessory to the general 
law–the private and public law that ascribe meaning and consequences to events, 
arrangements, and relationships among social and economic actors. In tax and 
social policy terms, it is accessory to the perceptions of public good and public 
need that are held by the public and implemented by the public’s representatives. 
Tax creates the pool of collective resources we use to pay for the features of our 
life that we want as social beings within the particular political and geograph-
ical setting, that we take for granted as the platform for all of our private acts 
and encounters.
B. WHERE TO START
The starting point for a critical evaluation of tax law is in fact several steps 
back from the tax system, at the point of understanding the elements of social 
intercourse and related public systems that foster civility. Tax law is not some sort 
of self-defining, self-perpetuating behemoth. The policy choices that the tax law 
implements, and that courts try to comprehend and effectuate when interpre-
tive doubt arises, require adherence to the rule of law, that is, standards found 
both within but also beyond the tax law–notably the constitutional, public, and 
private law footings of the tax law.
C. TRANSLATING ASPIRATIONS TO OUTCOMES
It is only within the law that the social and political choices the tax law is meant 
to animate, and their distributional effects,15 acquire legitimacy. Accordingly, our 
15. Brooks, supra note 1 at 97-98.
WILKIE & HOGG, TAX LAW WITHIN THE LARGER LEGAL SYSTEM 466
reference to standards found both within and beyond the tax law is important. 
The challenge is to understand the law in terms of the policy choices it is meant 
to reflect and serve according to legal principles that speak with authority. Neil’s 
“pragmatic and dynamic approach to statutory interpretation”16 offers insight 
into how respect for the law and indeed recognition of the need to operate within 
it as a concomitant dimension of civility and decency would be balanced by an 
unwillingness to accept ostensibly “legal” outcomes when the law seems to serve 
false masters or seems stultified by needless and even foolish constraints relative 
to the tax policy it evidently should enliven.
According to Neil,
[a] pragmatic and dynamic approach to statutory interpretation has five advantages 
over the conventional approach that judges apply: it is more consistent with 
democratic theory, it results in a more sensible specialization of functions between 
the legislature and the courts, it leads to more objective and determinate decisions, 
it allows for a system of implementation that accounts for changing circumstances, 
and it results in a better tax system.17
To those ends, judges (we use the term expansively to include anyone 
entrusted with and responsible for interpreting and giving practical effect to 
tax law, including the “judges” of first instance who are taxpayers and advisers 
making initial determinations about how the law should be interpreted and 
applied) should always consider tax principles to reach legitimate and principled 
conclusions despite the particular state or narrowly perceived limitations of the 
statutory tax law.
We perceive tax principles, however, to be more than aspirational tax policy 
apart from the statutory law. These principles are “in” the statutory law and 
their discovery involves no less legal analysis than other possibly less challenging 
aspects of applying law.18 Moreover, those tax principles are principles of law in 
themselves, and are infused with the influence of private, public, and consti-
tutional law that determine the nature of rights and relationships to which tax 
principles and tax law are responsive. This perception of tax principles is one 
with which we think Neil would agree, and, in fact, it has animated much of 
his scholarship.19 A just tax outcome, according to this reference point, should 
be just regardless of whether an interpretation strains “the usage … [of the same 
words] … in any other context,” the “words used are ambiguous or are used in a 
16. Ibid at 101.
17. Ibid at 101-102.
18. Ibid at 100.
19. Ibid at 99-100.
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way that is over- or under-inclusive of a sensible interpretation of the section,” or 
the words used are “specific.”20
How the tax law nevertheless exists as part of a larger legal system, it is 
important to note, underpins Neil’s observation, expressed as encouragement 
to tax judges to be active interpreters of law whose organic context requires a 
dynamic approach to its application. He has said:
Indeed, the only circumstance in which judges should reach a result that they 
feel is not consistent with the tax policy principles underlying the structure of the 
legislation is in a case in which it is clear that the statute was designed to resolve the 
specific case in a way other than the judge thinks sensible in terms of tax policies 
and principles.21
In other words, the point of departure is “the tax policy principles underlying 
the structure of the legislation.”22 These are generally controlling. Departures are 
permitted as long as they are required by the law, that is, “it is clear that the statute 
was designed to resolve the specific case,”23 not as judicial inclinations otherwise 
might recommend.
Put slightly differently, in terms that help us get on with our thesis, the 
defining objective of applying the tax law should be to promote detectable tax 
policies and principles, albeit still as evident law, and to be constrained from 
giving full pragmatic effect to this approach only where the statute effectively 
forbids the preferred outcome. Regardless of how the proposition is framed, 
the law, and the rule of law, as the host of the tax law, matters.24 This objective 
compels our attention regardless of the intensity or direction of our social and 
political views.
D. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
The most obvious way in which tax law is influenced by the larger legal system is 
the legal requirement to conform to the Constitution of Canada. The power to 
impose taxes is granted by the Constitution Act, 1867 25 to both the Parliament of 
20. Ibid at 100-101.
21. Ibid at 100.
22. Ibid [emphasis added].
23. Ibid [emphasis added].
24. See ibid. For a concise allusion to related thinking of some legal theorists, see Ronald 
Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1986). Regardless 
of the selected notion of formulation of “law” or approach to its interpretation, the law 
is the essential framework for the imposition of enforceable limitations on otherwise 
unrestricted activity.
25. (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5.
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Canada and the legislatures of the provinces. In the case of Parliament, the head 
of power is “The raising of money by any mode or system of taxation.”26 This 
power extends to any kind of taxation. In the case of the provincial legislatures, 
the head of power is “Direct taxation within the province in order to the raising 
of a revenue for provincial purposes.”27 This power is limited to “direct” taxes, 
and they must be levied “within the province.” Failure to comply with these and 
other constitutional restrictions28 leads to the invalidity of the tax. It is outside 
the scope of this article to discuss these federal restrictions on the power to tax, a 
field that has been well tilled elsewhere.29
The Charter, which was only adopted in 1982, has had a pervasive influence 
on tax law (as it has on other areas of Canadian law). We set out below some 
examples of interactions between the Charter and the tax system that have 
brought changes to or otherwise challenged the tax system.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE CHARTER
A. TAX POLICY
The adoption of the Charter imposed a new set of restrictions on Parliament 
and the legislatures, which applied to their respective taxation powers no less 
than to other heads of legislative power. What the Charter did was to insist that 
tax law take account of more fundamental human rights values, even when they 
conflicted with sound public policy. In Thibaudeau v Canada,30 the claimant 
was a divorced woman who had custody of the children of the marriage and 
who received child-support payments from her ex-spouse. She objected to the 
provision of the Income Tax Act that required her to pay income tax on the 
support payments she received. She argued that the Act discriminated against 
separated custodial parents (who were mostly women) by forcing them to pay tax 
on their child-support payments, and that this infringed the equality guarantee 
in section 15 of the Charter.
26. Ibid, s 91(3).
27. Ibid, s 92(2).
28. Section 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867 provides that “No lands or property belonging to 
Canada or any province shall be liable to taxation.” See ibid.
29. For an account of the law and references to the literature, see generally Peter W Hogg, 
Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) ch 31 [Hogg, Constitutional 
Law, 5th ed]. See also Joseph Eliot Magnet, “The Constitution Distribution of Taxation 
Powers in Canada” (1978) 10:3 Ottawa L Rev 473.
30. [1995] 2 SCR 627, 124 DLR (4th) 449 [Thibaudeau cited to SCR].
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The Supreme Court rejected the argument by a majority. It was true that in 
an intact family, all the tax would be paid by the spouse who earned the income. 
But the Court pointed out that the inclusion requirement on the recipient spouse 
was matched by a deduction for the payor spouse. Since the payor spouse was 
normally in a higher tax bracket than the recipient spouse, the tax saved by the 
deduction would normally exceed the tax incurred by the inclusion. This income 
split would usually result in a reduction of tax for separated couples–a reduction 
that cost the treasury over $300 million each year.31 That was the cost of a system 
that was designed to deliver a subsidy for the benefit of separated custodial 
parents like Ms. Thibaudeau.
While the payor of the support received the benefit of the deduction 
and the recipient bore the burden of the tax, family law required that the tax 
consequences be taken into account in fixing the amount of child support: the 
payor’s enhanced ability to pay should be recognized and the amount of child 
support should be grossed up to fully compensate the recipient for her added tax 
liability. In Thibaudeau, the family court that made the support order had taken 
her additional tax into account, but had underestimated the liability so that the 
gross-up for tax was insufficient.32 But the Supreme Court majority held that the 
solution to that problem was a review of the support order by the family court.33 
Although not all separated custodial parents benefitted from the deduction-
inclusion system, as a group they did benefit, and the Act did not discriminate 
against them.34 Therefore, there was no breach of section 15 of the Charter.
Although Ms. Thibaudeau lost the court battle, she won the war against 
the deduction-inclusion system. Her cause was taken up successfully by women’s 
groups, who were no doubt encouraged by the fact that Justices McLachlin and 
L’Heureux-Dubé, the two (highly respected) female judges on the Court, both 
dissented on the basis that the family law system could not be relied upon to 
pass the tax subsidy forward to the dependent spouse. In 1997, the Act was 
amended to deny the child support recipient’s income tax liability and the 
payor’s corresponding deduction. At the same time, guidelines were adopted for 
calculating child support and improvements were made in the enforcement of 
court-ordered support. But the tax changes eliminated the subsidy that had been 
in place since 1942 when it was introduced with the avowed purpose of helping 
31. See ibid at para 12.
32. Ibid at paras 160-61.
33. Ibid at para 151.
34. Ibid at paras 149-50.
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split families bear the extra costs of maintaining two households. The only clear 
beneficiary of the tax changes was the treasury!
Does Thibaudeau tell us anything useful about the relationship between the 
Charter and the tax system? Although the tax subsidy was upheld by a majority of 
the Supreme Court, the perception that it offended the Charter value of equality 
was probably decisive in its repeal. Subtle arguments about a tax subsidy created 
by income splitting could not overcome the undeniable facts that the dependent 
recipient spouse had to pay tax on her child support payments, while the payor 
spouse received a deduction for making the payments. It looked unequal.
B. INVESTIGATION OF TAX OFFENCES
The Income Tax Act confers on tax officials the power to require a taxpayer to 
produce books and records and the power to inspect books and records; neither 
power requires a search warrant or similar process. According to the Act, these 
powers are available for the “administration or enforcement” of the Act.35 Under 
section 8 of the Charter, which guarantees against “unreasonable search or 
seizure,” exercise of the power of police or other officials to demand documents 
and inspect their contents must normally be authorized by a search warrant 
issued by a judge, who must be persuaded with evidence that there are reasonable 
grounds to suppose that an offence has been committed and that evidence of the 
offence is likely to be found in the place stipulated in the warrant.36
35. ITA, supra note 3, s 231.1(1)(a).
36. The Income Tax Act itself contains its own provisions authorizing search and seizure by tax 
officials in support of the investigation of tax offences. After the adoption of the Charter 
in 1982, these provisions were struck down for multiple constitutional defects. The Act 
authorized the warrant to be issued by the Minister, not by an independent judge; there was 
no requirement that the Minister had grounds to believe that evidence would be found in 
the place to be searched; there was no requirement that the warrant list the documents and 
things that were to be searched for; and, once the warrant was issued, the warrant-holder 
was not limited to searching for evidence of the suspected offence stipulated in the warrant, 
but could search for violations of “any” of the provisions of the Act. For all these reasons, 
the search and seizure provisions of the Act did not satisfy s 8 of the Charter and were struck 
down. See MNR v Kruger, [1984] 2 FC 535, 13 DLR (4th) 706 (CA). See also Re Print 
Three (1985), 51 OR (2d) 321, 20 DLR (4th) 586 (CA). The Act was amended and all of 
these defects were corrected, but a further constitutional challenge revealed another defect: 
the amended provisions did not allow for any discretion on the part of the issuing judge. In 
Baron, the Court held that this was also a breach of s 8; the issuing judge could not be an 
impartial arbiter if he or she were simply “to act as a rubber stamp.” See Baron v Canada, 
[1993] 1 SCR 416 at para 38, 99 DLR (4th) 350 [Baron]. Part of the new section was struck 
down for this reason. The current iteration of the search warrant requirements is s 231.3 of 
the Act; it now seems to be well and truly Charter-proof. See ITA, supra note 3, s 231.3.
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However, the Supreme Court has made an exception for “regulatory 
inspections,” recognizing that many regulatory regimes use inspectors who visit 
the locations of the regulated activity to check for compliance with the law. These 
routine or random inspections are in the nature of spot checks. They are not 
premised on the suspicion that an offence is being committed, and therefore 
there would be no point in requiring inspectors to obtain a search warrant for 
each visit to a building site, restaurant, factory, office, or other regulated site. 
In effect, there is a diminished expectation of privacy in the sites and records of 
regulated activity. Therefore, while administrative inspections of sites and records 
during normal business hours in order to check for compliance with the law 
must be authorized by the regulatory statute, they do not require the additional 
authority of a search warrant. They are not unreasonable searches within the 
meaning of section 8 of the Charter.
In R v McKinlay Transport Ltd,37 the Supreme Court held that the Income Tax 
Act was a regulatory statute and that tax officials needed powers of spot-checking 
to supervise taxpayers’ self-reporting of income. The Court upheld the Act’s grant 
of power to the Minister to make a warrantless demand for a taxpayer’s private 
documents and to search those documents for evidence of non-compliance with 
the Act. By analogy with regulated industries, the Court held that taxpayers have 
a diminished expectation of privacy with respect to records pertaining to the 
earning of income or other taxable activities. In Baron v Canada,38 however, the 
regulatory character of the Act did not suffice to authorize a warrantless entry 
onto private premises to search for evidence of a tax offence. The search in that 
case was not a routine monitoring of compliance with the Act, but was based on 
suspicion that an offence had been committed and was intended to yield evidence 
for the prosecution of the offence. That kind of search required a warrant.
The Supreme Court explained the distinction between McKinlay and Baron 
in more detail in R v Jarvis.39 The Court said that a distinction must be drawn 
between the audit function of tax officials and their investigative function.40 The 
audit function is the spot-checking of taxpayers’ records to monitor compliance 
with the Act. When engaged in that function, tax officials may exercise the 
statutory powers they were granted to demand the production of documents and 
to inspect the documents without the need for the authority of a warrant. This 
is so even if the audit turns up evidence of non-compliance with the Act: such 
37. [1990] 1 SCR 627 at 13, 21, 68 DLR (4th) 568 [McKinlay].
38. Baron, supra note 36.
39. 2002 SCC 73, [2002] 3 SCR 757 [Jarvis].
40. Ibid at para 84.
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evidence may be used by tax officials as the basis for the imposition of civil 
penalties or even prosecution for less serious summary offences. The Act may 
validly confer regulatory powers to demand records and inspect them provided 
that the powers are limited to the audit function.
However, section 239 of the Act also contains a set of mens rea offences 
essentially concerned with tax evasion, and for these offences, the Act provides 
severe penalties, including imprisonment. When tax officials develop a suspicion 
that a tax-evasion offence has been committed, and the “predominant purpose” 
of their work becomes an inquiry into whether the suspected offence has been 
committed, their function changes from audit to investigation.41 At that point, 
the regulatory powers of demand and inspection that sustained the audit 
function cease to apply. Tax officials may not use audit powers to conduct a 
criminal investigation. Documents already obtained during the audit phase may 
be retained and used in the investigation phase and may also be used as evidence 
in any subsequent criminal trial. This follows from the taxpayer’s low expectation 
of privacy in documents that have already been lawfully obtained by the tax 
officials. But once the investigation phase starts, section 8 of the Charter applies 
in full force,42 and no new material may be obtained from the taxpayer except 
under the authority of a search warrant.
C. TAX PENALTIES
A traditional enforcement tool of tax officials is the civil penalty. The Act provides 
for a penalty for a variety of acts and omissions that are contrary to the Act or 
its regulations, including failure to file a tax return, late filing of a tax return, 
failure to provide information required by a prescribed form, failure to report 
an item of income, and false statement or omission in a return.43 These penalties 
are customarily described as “civil,” no doubt because they are imposed by the 
Minister on a taxpayer as part of the assessment process without any intervention 
by a prosecutor or criminal court, but they are penalties nonetheless. Many of 
the acts and omissions that are the subject of civil penalties are also the subject of 
criminal penalties under section 239 of the Act. If the CRA and the Department 
41. Ibid at paras 88-89.
42. Ibid at paras 69-98. Jarvis also held that if the suspected offence carried the penalty of 
imprisonment, then s 7 of the Charter applied to the investigation as well as section 8 (ibid 
at para 95). Section 7 includes protection against self-incrimination, which reinforces s 8 
by also requiring any material sought from the taxpayer in the investigation phase to be 
obtained under the authority of a search warrant.
43. ITA, supra note 3, ss 162, 163, 163.2.
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of Justice take the view that the civil penalty is an inadequate punishment given 
the culpability of the taxpayer’s conduct, a criminal charge will be laid against the 
taxpayer and criminal penalties will be sought in addition to the civil penalty (if 
a civil penalty has been imposed).
A prosecution must comply with section 11 of the Charter, which prescribes 
rules of due process when a person is “charged with an offence.” In particular, the 
defendant benefits from the presumption of innocence (section 11(d)), which 
requires the prosecution to prove the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable 
doubt,44 and which also requires that a determination of guilt be made by “an 
independent and impartial tribunal.”45 The latter requirement is satisfied by 
the judge of the criminal court. These safeguards for the protection of a person 
charged with an offence are of course absent when the Minister imposes a civil 
penalty. Are the requirements of section 11 of the Charter inapplicable when 
Parliament creates penalties that can be imposed by the Minister as part of the 
assessment process?
This question has not been directly answered by the Supreme Court in the 
context of the Act, but an analogous question has been answered in the context 
of the Customs Act.46 The Customs Act authorizes the forfeiture of property for 
breaches of the Act. Where the property in issue cannot be found, it authorizes 
a demand for a monetary sum equal to the value of the property. In Martineau v 
MNR,47 a customs officer made a demand for $315,458, alleging that this amount 
was the value of stolen vehicles that a person had attempted to export by making 
false statements. In proceedings to appeal the demand, the exporter refused to 
participate in an examination for discovery, claiming that he was entitled not to 
testify by reason of his section 11(c) Charter right to not to be compelled as a 
witness. This contention raised the question whether section 11 of the Charter 
could apply to civil proceedings for forfeiture.
The Supreme Court had said in an earlier case (a disciplinary proceeding 
against a police officer) that a civil proceeding would attract the protection of 
44. Section 238 of the Act contains offences of strict liability in which mens rea need not be 
established by the prosecution, but the taxpayer has a defence of due diligence. See e.g. R 
v Sedhu, 2013 BCSC 2323, 2013 CarswellBC 3828. In the case of “regulatory offences,” 
this interpretation has been accepted as satisfying s 11(d) of the Charter. See R v Wholesale 
Travel Group, [1991] 3 SCR 154, 84 DLR (4th) 161. Section 239 of the Act contains 
offences for which mens rea is an essential element, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
would be required.
45. See generally Valente v The Queen, [1985] 2 SCR 673, 24 DLR (4th) 161.
46. RSC 1985, c 1 (2nd Supp).
47. 2004 SCC 81, [2004] 3 SCR 737 [Martineau].
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section 11 if it “may lead to a true penal consequence”;48 and a monetary penalty 
would be a true penal consequence if “by its magnitude” it “would appear to be 
imposed for the purpose of redressing the wrong done to society at large.”49 In terms 
of magnitude, the figure of $315,458 was higher than the maximum fine for an 
actual offence under the Customs Act, but only if the prosecution were summary; 
the figure was less than the maximum fine if the prosecution were brought by 
indictment. However, unlike the fines that were imposed for offences under the 
Act, forfeiture was directed at the thing itself, not the guilt or innocence of the 
owner (who might not even be the person alleged to have breached the Act). A 
demand for money in lieu of forfeiture (as in this case) was also not premised on 
guilt or innocence, in that the sum demanded was arrived at simply by estimating 
the value of the goods, not by reference to the principles that normally guide 
sentencing in criminal courts. The Court concluded that the “deemed forfeiture” 
was not a true penal consequence and that section 11(c) of the Charter was not 
applicable to protect the exporter from being examined for discovery.
It is a safe inference from Martineau that a tax penalty that is imposed on 
a taxpayer by the Minister, and that is calculated by reference to an objective 
standard that is proportionate to the breach of the Act (for example, a percentage 
of the tax avoided by virtue of the non-compliance) would not be a true penal 
consequence and would not be unconstitutional by reason of section 11 of the 
Charter. In other regulatory contexts, courts below the level of the Supreme 
Court have been surprisingly ready to take a few steps beyond Martineau by 
upholding “administrative monetary penalties” that are imposed at the discretion 
of an administrative tribunal based on considerations of blameworthiness and 
deterrence, provided the magnitude of the penalties does not seem dispropor-
tionate in that regulatory context.
For example, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld an administrative 
monetary penalty of $520,000 imposed by the Ontario Securities Commission 
on an individual stockbroker who had committed breaches of securities law.50 
Justice Sharpe for the court said that the Commission’s penalty “was geared to its 
regulatory mandate” and did not rise to the level of a true penal consequence.51 
This decision and others like it have encouraged legislative bodies to do an end 
run around the section 11 safeguards by conferring on tribunals or officials the 
48. R v Wigglesworth [1987] 2 SCR 541 at 559, 45 DLR (4th) 235 [Wigglesworth].
49. Ibid at 561.
50. Rowan v Ontario Securities Commission, 2012 ONCA 208, 110 OR (3d) 492.
51. Ibid at para 54.
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power to impose civil penalties that are very similar to the fines that used to be 
the exclusive domain of the criminal courts.52
Where the Income Tax Act may have crossed the line is in the third-party 
penalties imposed by section 163.2. This section empowers the Minister to 
impose a penalty on tax advisers (“planners” and “preparers”) who make “false 
statements” to taxpayers in “circumstances amounting to culpable conduct.” 
What is unusual about this penalty is that it is imposed, not on the taxpayers 
who are the primary subjects of the regulatory system, but on third parties. 
This arguably takes the penalty outside the regulatory system “for the purpose 
of redressing the wrong done to society at large.”53 In addition, the magnitude 
of the penalty has the potential to be very large indeed for advisers engaged in 
marketing tax shelters, because it is essentially calculated as the sum of all the 
penalties to which the taxpayers receiving the advice would be liable if they had 
made the false statement in their own tax returns. This brings us to Guindon.
In Guindon,54 the Minister assessed a section 163.2 penalty of $546,747 
against a lawyer who became a participant in a complex scheme, the end result of 
which was that taxpayers claimed charitable donation credits for donations that 
were never made. The lawyer had provided a legal opinion on documents that she 
did not see and that did not in fact exist, and after she became aware of the true 
situation she had nevertheless signed tax receipts for charitable credits to the 134 
people to whom the scheme had been marketed. She appealed the assessment of 
the penalty and was successful at the Tax Court, which held that section 163.2 
was unconstitutional because it purported to impose a “true penal consequence” 
without the safeguards guaranteed by section 11 of the Charter.55 In effect, 
the lawyer was a “person charged with an offence,” and she was entitled to the 
presumption of innocence, which raised the standard of proof from a balance of 
probabilities to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.56 She was also entitled to be 
tried by an “independent and impartial tribunal,” which meant that she would 
have to be prosecuted in provincial court under the criminal procedure provided 
for in the Criminal Code.57 The Tax Court accordingly vacated the penalty that 
had been imposed on the lawyer.58
52. For a fuller discussion of administrative monetary penalties, see Hogg, Constitutional Law, 
5th ed, supra note 29 at 51-4.
53. Wigglesworth, supra note 48 at 561.
54. Guindon, FCA, supra note 8; Guindon, TCC, supra note 2.
55. Ibid at para 70.
56. Ibid at para 31.
57. Ibid at para 6.
58. Ibid at para 113.
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However, on appeal to the Federal Court of Appeal, the penalty was restored. 
Justice Stratas, who wrote for the court, held that the proceedings were adminis-
trative in nature (rather than criminal) and had the object of protecting “the 
proper functioning of the administrative system of self-assessment and reporting 
under the Act.”59 He emphasized that the penalty (like the others in the Act) is 
calculated by a “non-discretionary formula,” with the result that the Minister, 
unlike a criminal court, does not in any way “evaluate the moral blameworthiness 
or turpitude of the conduct.”60 As for the magnitude of the penalty, administra-
tive penalties sometimes have to be large “to deter conduct detrimental to the 
administrative scheme,” and the adviser penalty “does not demonstrate a purpose 
extending beyond deterrence to denunciation and punishment of the offender 
for the ‘wrong done to society.’”61 The conclusion was that the adviser penalty in 
the Act did not fall afoul of section 11(d) of the Charter.
Guindon was a very close case. There was much to be said on both sides of 
the constitutional argument, and the definitive word is still to be spoken. The 
Supreme Court heard the appeal of the Federal Court of Appeal’s decision late 
in 2014, but has not yet rendered its decision. Although the Court of Appeal 
upheld the adviser penalty, there must be a point at which a “civil penalty,” by 
its purpose and magnitude, becomes indistinguishable from the sanction for an 
“offence.” At that point, the Act’s system of civil penalties would enter the realm 
of criminal justice: the person subject to the penalty would have to be accorded 
the same safeguards as other persons in jeopardy of punishment by the state. The 
efficiency and convenience of allowing the Minister to assess a penalty does at 
some point have to give way to the normal due process norms that protect those 
charged with an offence.
Of course, the Act itself has never shied away from these distinctions. As we 
have noticed, section 239 provides for offences under the Act where tax has been 
wilfully evaded, and provides for fines and imprisonment as penalties. Offences 
under section 239 cannot be dealt with simply by ministerial assessment; they are 
prosecuted in provincial court with all the due process protections of the Charter 
and the Criminal Code. In Guindon, the judge of the Tax Court commented that 
59. Guindon, FCA, supra note 8 at para 42.
60. Ibid at para 44.
61. Ibid at paras 46-47. Stratus JA also pointed out that, if a penalty set by formula really were 
too harsh, the Minister had a discretion to cancel all or part of the penalty (ibid at para 56). 
Stratus JA even raised the possibility of the application of s 12 of the Charter to a penalty that 
was so disproportionate as to amount to “cruel and unusual punishment,” but acknowledged 
that this was unlikely ever to succeed in view of the proportionality built into the formulae 
by which tax penalties are calculated (ibid at para 60).
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the conduct covered by section 239 was “strikingly similar” to the “culpable” 
conduct covered by section 163.2 and added that “one suspects that section 
163.2 of the Act was enacted as an alternative to section 239, which has proven 
to be cumbersome for the Crown.”62 But the prosecution of accused persons is 
always cumbersome for the Crown because of the due process safeguards that 
have always been part of the common law’s criminal justice system and are now 
enshrined in the Charter. Although section 163.2 received a reprieve from the 
Federal Court of Appeal, no regulatory system can escape the fundamental norms 
of the larger legal system. That includes the tax system.
IV. INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW AND TAX POLICY
The second theme of this article about tax law within the larger legal system has 
to do with the tax system’s fundamental dependence on notions of property, 
contract, relationship, activity, and entitlement that must have well-defined and 
enforceable legal effects as the precursor to affecting and being affected by tax law. 
We tend to take this for granted, almost as an inevitable inherent feature of the 
law, when the tax law applies to domestic circumstances–those that are exclusively 
within Canada’s economic and geographic confines. However, the significance of 
the larger legal system becomes more acute and much more visible when “our 
law” encounters, even competes with, the tax and private law of other countries 
because income earning activities of taxpayers transcend political borders and 
geography. Those sorts of limitations are indeed increasingly irrelevant economi-
cally. Income that has its source in one country often has an owner who resides 
in another. The complexity is compounded when this two-country axis is further 
subdivided by the intervention of other participants and third countries in the 
transmission of income to its owner: there may be a variety of stops along the 
way, orchestrated by legal instruments drawing authority from different countries’ 
legal systems.63
62. Guindon, TCC, supra note 2 at paras 45-46.
63. For an example of the stresses that arise from typical international tax jurisdiction notions 
and the country-to-country trade-offs and accommodations that are embedded in 
“international tax policy,” see Charles I Kingson, “The Coherence of International Taxation” 
(1981) 81:6 Colum L Rev 1151. See also Richard M Bird & Scott Wilkie, “Source- vs. 
Residence-based Taxation in the European Union: The Wrong Question?” in Sijbren 
Cnossen, ed, Taxing Capital Income in the European Union: Issues and Options for Reform 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 78.
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A. “INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW”
The first “rule” of international tax law is that there is no “international tax law,” 
nor an international tax code or tax regulator. That said, impelled by globaliza-
tion’s challenge to many aspects of international business and personal relations, 
systematic connections among tax authorities and taxpayers’ responses to them 
give rise to effects in some respects akin to a constructive international tax system. 
For example, this may be inferred from countries’ adoption of compatible or 
similarly directed domestic tax responses to common international economic 
events, which often are captured in a tailored way through bespoke tax treaties 
with legal force to align the specific intersection of countries’ tax regimes. The 
modern tendency towards an international convergence of domestic law responses 
to international economic circumstances originated with formative work by the 
League of Nations, leading to early tax treaty drafts under its auspices and that of 
the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), the precursor 
to the OECD. The OECD succeeded to this work and remains one of the main 
supranational organizations in the world dedicated to resolving international 
tax policy and administration issues, reflected most recently in its ongoing work 
inspired by the G-20 to address “base erosion and profit shifting,”64 as well as its 
continuing examination of “intangibles” in the “transfer pricing” context.65 Work 
of the United Nations in the tax area has followed a parallel and increasingly 
prominent path, with a closer orientation however to the needs and circum-
stances of less developed countries. The European Commission exerts influence 
over international tax issues in and in relation to Europe.
The thinking and direction of the OECD in tax matters has a significant 
influence on Canada’s tax policy and tax administration and on the adjudication 
64. See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (Paris: OECD, 2013), online: <dx.
doi.org/10.1787/9789264192744-en> [OECD, Addressing Base Erosion]. See also OECD, 
Action Plan, supra note 9. There are also various OECD discussion drafts and deliverables 
forming part of its BEPS project, including certain final deliverables on some subjects 
tendered in September 2014 and additional working drafts on subjects announced publicly 
in mid-December 2014 and slated for final reports in 2015. See e.g. OECD, BEPS Action 10: 
Discussion Draft on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Cross-Border Commodity Transactions, Public 
Discussion Draft (16 December 2014); OECD Convention, infra note 67.
65. See OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Discussion Draft, Revision of the 
Special Considerations for Intangibles In Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
and Related Provisions (2012) [OECD, Revision of Chapter VI]; OECD, Revised Discussion 
Draft on Transfer Pricing Aspects of Intangibles (2013). For the OECD’s most recently release 
in the context of BEPS, see OECD, BEPS Actions 8, 9 and 10: Discussion Draft on Revisions 
to Chapter I of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines (Including Risk, Recharacterisation, and Special 
Measures) (2014) [OECD, Revisions to Chapter I].
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of tax disputes by officials and courts. At a primary level, the output of the 
OECD in tax matters has legal significance at least as customary international 
law and also treaty law. Canada has ratified both the OECD Convention66 and 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.67 The latter is seen generally 
as an articulation of customary international law; it obliges its adherents to 
observe their international treaty commitments in good faith and to abjure from 
domestic law departures from them. Canada is a member of the OECD Council, 
which adopts international tax standards formulated as guidance by the OECD. 
Countries that take exception to these standards may and in fact are expected to 
express formal reservations absent which their agreement, as a standard within 
which their laws are expected to operate, may be inferred. This expectation does 
not mean that the OECD standards are automatically imported with legal force 
into countries’ domestic laws, but the intention of the OECD standard is to erect 
a bar to domestic law that would be inconsistent with those standards.
B. THE INFLUENCE AND EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL TAX GUIDANCE
Two particularly influential statements of international tax guidance by the 
OECD are the OECD Model Tax Convention68 and the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines.69 Both have considerable probative significance in applying the Act 
and tax treaties.70
The OECD Model Tax Convention (including its influential Commentary) 
is the acknowledged starting point–the model in fact–for many countries’ tax 
treaties, including Canada’s. Not infrequently, though, features of the United 
Nations Model Tax Convention71 are adopted in Canada’s tax treaties with 
developing countries and in treaties where Canada may, oddly perhaps, in a 
66. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 
Convention), 14 December 1960, 1973 UNTS 181, UKTS 1962, No 21 (entered into force 
30 September 1961).
67. May 23 1969, 1155 UNTS 332, UKTS 1987, No 11 (entered into force 27 January 1980).
68. OECD, Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital (2014).
69. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 12. But see the ongoing examination of 
important transfer pricing subjects in OECD, Revision of Chapter VI, supra note 65.
70. Crown Forest Industries Ltd v Canada, [1995] 2 SCR 802, 125 DLR (4th) 485. See also 
Prévost Car Inc v Canada, 2009 FCA 57, [2010] 2 FCR 65.
71. United Nations, United Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and 
Developing Countries (New York: United Nations, 2011).
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particular economic setting be thought to suffer vulnerability akin to that of a 
developing country.72
The OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines have long been referred to by the 
CRA as the foundation for Canada’s rules in the Act associated with transfer 
pricing, formerly subsections 69(2) and 69(3) and now section 247. The CRA’s 
relevant administrative practice, Information Circular IC 87-2R,73 as recently 
supplemented by Transfer Pricing Memorandum TPM-14,74 virtually adopts 
by reference the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, although it is to be noted, 
and was noted by the Supreme Court in the recent GlaxoSmithKline case,75 
that none of the particularity in the Transfer Pricing Guidelines nor, indeed, the 
Guidelines themselves, are actually in the Act or have otherwise been given the 
force of statutory law.
GlaxoSmithKline presented the Supreme Court with one of its first 
opportunities to adjudicate transfer pricing. Broadly, transfer pricing tests the 
compatibility of the reported income of a member of a commonly controlled 
multinational group of corporations arising from transactions between its legally 
separate group members, against the income that would have been reported by an 
independent party transacting in equivalent (or in transfer pricing terminology, 
72. In light of the OECD’s observations on when the provision of services by a corporation in a 
country of which it is not a resident might be treated as giving rise in itself to a “permanent 
establishment,” art V(9) of the Canada - United States Income Tax Convention added by the 
Fifth Protocol (2007) to that Convention is interesting. See US, Department of the Treasury, 
Technical Exploration of the Protocol Done at Chelsea on September 21, 2007 Amending the 
Convention Between the United States of America and Canada with Respect to Taxes on Income 
and on Capital (Chelsea: September 2007) at 10. See also OECD, Model Tax Convention 
on Income and on Capital, Commentary to Article 5 (2012) at paras 42.11-42.48. There is 
ongoing work by tax experts on the United Nations Tax Committee considering whether the 
United Nations Model Tax Convention should adopt a protocol for establishing the delivery 
of services as a “permanent establishment.” See e.g. Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters, Report on the Sixth Session, ESC, 6th Sess, Supp No 25, UN 
Doc E/2010/45 (2010). The 2012 Boston General Congress of the International Fiscal 
Association has discussed this formative work as well.
73. Canada Revenue Agency, Information Circular IC 87-2R, “International Transfer Pricing” 
(27 September 1999).
74. Canada Revenue Agency, Transfer Pricing Memorandum TPM-14, “2010 Update of the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines” (31 October 2012).
75. GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 11. See also Commissioner of Taxation v SNF Australia Pty Ltd, 
[2011] FCAFC 74, 2011 ATC 20-265 at para 118 (affirming, in line with GlaxoSmithKline, 
that the OECD Guidelines “are not a legitimate aid to the construction of the double 
taxation treaties and neither are they permissible materials for interpreting the double tax 
treaties Australia has entered into”).
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“comparable”) circumstances, according to an “arm’s length standard.”76 The 
issue in GlaxoSmithKline concerned whether the price paid by the Canadian 
GlaxoSmithKline subsidiary to one group member for the active ingredient 
in a branded gastrointestinal remedy was overstated compared to the price of 
generic (but, according to the Crown, pharmaceutically similar version of the 
ingredient), in circumstances where the Canadian subsidiary paid another group 
member royalties for the use of certain intellectual property including rights that 
pertained to this remedy. If so, the Crown argued, other things considered, the 
Canadian subsidiary’s income would be understated.
This case highlighted the significance of the OECD Transfer Pricing 
Guidelines, which are generally at the heart of tax authority practices addressed 
to transfer pricing. The Federal Court of Appeal took the view that all relevant 
business circumstances should be considered, including not just the active 
ingredient transfer transaction but also circumstances relating to the Canadian 
taxpayer’s access to group intellectual property. It reversed the Tax Court’s 
decision that the pricing of the active ingredient transaction, which was in the 
Tax Court’s view the only relevant transfer in the case, was incompatible with the 
expectations of the arm’s length standard. The Supreme Court upheld the Federal 
Court of Appeal’s decision.77 The Supreme Court made a number of observations 
about the significance of the Transfer Pricing Guidelines and, more generally, how 
a transfer pricing analysis framed by the objectives of the arm’s length standard 
should be conducted to take into account not only relevant circumstances 
extending beyond the active ingredient transfer per se but also the frailties of a 
transfer pricing “comparables” analysis as typically understood.
Justice Rothstein observed for the Court that, even though the Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines may offer analytical guidance, they are not and do not have 
the effect of statutory law.78 They are not to be read and applied as if the Act and 
the Income Tax Regulations had adopted them, or as if they had the kind of 
76. This standard has been adopted by the OECD as the “Accepted OECD Approach,” or 
“AOA,” to attribute business income to a “permanent establishment.” See OECD, Centre 
for Tax Policy and Administration, 2010 Report on the Attribution of Profits to Permanent 
Establishments (2010); OECD, Centre for Tax Policy and Administration, Revised 
Commentary on Article 7 of the OECD Model Tax Convention (2007). Canada and the United 
States have specifically imported this standard into the application of art VII of the Canada–
United States Income Tax Convention, via para 9 of Annex B to the Fifth Protocol (2007), 
amending that Convention and a related 19 July 2012 agreement between Canada and 
the United States.
77. GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 11.
78. Ibid at paras 20-21.
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sympathetic quasi-legal significance as many who apply them would seem to have 
thought, including the CRA. In light of the absence, as such, in the Act of any 
direct or specific manifestation of the transfer pricing methodologies and related 
practices in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, the Guidelines’ mandatory 
and exclusive force is at least debatable, as might also be administrative interpreta-
tions and extensions of those Guidelines by tax authorities including the CRA in 
the absence of statutory law adopting and incorporating them. In the result, the 
application of the transfer pricing law as legislated is not to be rigidly or narrowly 
constrained by the Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Based on how the Supreme Court 
saw it, the law may have a much higher tolerance than prevailing administrative 
practices of tax authorities for the application of various analytical approaches to 
test the adequate of a taxpayer’s income with reference to transfer prices. This is 
the overarching objective of transfer pricing. It is served, applying transfer pricing 
law and guidance, by detecting and neutralizing non-commercial, seemingly 
tax-drive distortions of a taxpayer’s reporting income attributable, essentially, to 
the opportunity afforded to a commonly controlled corporate group to engage in 
transactions on terms that would not be possible if only commercial factors and 
influences were taken into account.
The Supreme Court’s critical evaluation of supranational transfer pricing 
guidance offers a vantage from which to reflect on tax law’s legal imperatives and 
the importance of the larger legal system.79 Pointedly, the transfer pricing guidance 
has long been accepted as informing the scope and application of the arm’s length 
principle in Canadian transfer pricing.80 It has been seen and in fact relied upon 
by all affected to give life to a critical expectation of business income taxation in 
an international setting. It articulates objectives and outcomes commonly treated 
as embedded in contemporary transfer pricing, no doubt affecting how well tax 
law’s overarching public objectives are achieved or indeed achievable. But is the 
law, apart from commonly held expectations about it, the reliable host we expect? 
Put another way, are our expectations about the force of the guidance qualified 
to the extent we cannot find the tenets of that guidance in our statutory tax law? 
And is this a consequence only of how well developed is the tax law, or are there 
private law considerations also at play?
79. Ibid.
80. OECD, Transfer Pricing Guidelines, supra note 12 at 31.
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C. “INTANGIBLES” AND “BASE EROSION”—WHOSE INCOME AND  
WHERE IS IT?
The possible inadequacy of Canada’s tax law (not unlike that of other countries) 
to give effect to its international tax policy commitments that are not tax law is 
highlighted by two recent OECD developments.
In the transfer pricing area, the OECD has undertaken a study of 
“intangibles.” Broadly, these are conceived as manifestations of knowledge, 
experience, know-how, goodwill, and other encapsulations of commercial value, 
including but not confined to legally protectable intellectual property. There is 
a concern, as recent considered discussion as well as popular journalism reflect, 
and which is recognized by the OECD, that these intangibles–drivers of value 
and profitability–may be easily configured and directed using contracts and other 
legal conventions essentially to economically disassemble corporate groups and 
business transfers within them, which formerly would have been accepted to be 
unitary. As a result, countries’ corporate tax bases may be much more infirm and 
the reach of their tax laws much shorter than thinking “inside the tax policy box” 
would have indicated. The effect, it is debated, is a separation of profits from the 
activities that generate them. In short, profits may be directed (and some would 
say misdirected), according to well-established legal conventions–respect for the 
corporate fiction and for contracts among them–that underlie most countries’ tax 
systems, possibly coming to temporary or permanent rest in places where neither 
the income formally arises nor its formal owner resides. In June 2012, the OECD 
took the unprecedented step of releasing for comment a non-consensus discussion 
draft of current thinking by OECD delegates on how to address this increasingly 
permanent feature of international business, which cuts to the core of the arm’s 
length principle that transfer pricing embodies.81 That OECD report envisages, 
essentially, an approach to analyzing and applying tax law to transmissions of 
value accountable to the development and use of intangibles within corporate 
families which is unconstrained by legal notions of property and ownership or by 
accounting conventions for defining and measuring contributors to profits. The 
essential direction of the report is preserved and refined in the OECD’s “Revised 
Discussion Draft on Transfer Aspects of Intangibles” published at the end of July 
81. See OECD, Revision of Chapter VI, supra note 65; OECD, Revisions to Chapter I, supra note 
65. See also S Wilkie, “Reflecting on the ‘Arm’s Length Principle’: What is the ‘Principle’? 
Where Next?” in Wolfgang Schön & Kai A Konrad, eds, Fundamentals of International 
Transfer Pricing in Law and Economics (Berlin: Springer, 2012) 137 [Wilkie, “Reflecting”]; 
Scott Wilkie, “The Definition and Ownership of Intangibles: Inside the Box? Outside the 
Box? What is the Box?” (2012) 4:3 WTJ 222 [Wilkie, “Definition”].
WILKIE & HOGG, TAX LAW WITHIN THE LARGER LEGAL SYSTEM 484
2013, still subject to ongoing work at the OECD and international consultation 
solicited by the OECD.82
It is fair to ask how analytical tendencies of this nature become effective in 
Canada’s or any other country’s tax system. Tax law, the framework for imposing 
tax and achieving the objectives served by a tax system, generally requires a 
tax subject (the taxpayer), a tax object (an item of property, a service, or some 
other manifestation of value) that the tax law defines or that is defined by the 
underlying private law to which the tax law is accessory, and a tax “realization 
event” (commonly associated with a “disposition” or some other reckoning event 
by which the tax system brings to account the value of a tax object in relation 
to a tax subject).83 What happens if the law is a poor host for the tax policy and 
economic guidance proposed by supra-national organizations of which Canada 
is a member? As Justice Rothstein observed in GlaxoSmithKline,84 saying it is 
so–saying it is or is like law–does not make it so.
What are we to make of this? Let us assume for the moment that we would 
all agree on the importance and right-mindedness at least directionally of the 
OECD’s work in this area, or indeed any other area in which the OECD offers 
guidance. Let us further assume that in the absence of being able to act on this 
guidance, the integrity of our tax system–its responsiveness to changing global 
business and economic events and its capacity to function well as an instrument 
of social justice–would be imperilled. Is it a good thing, a “right” thing, neverthe-
less, to sanction our citizens–even our business citizens and visitors – as if the law 
captured this guidance, to ensure that as a country we are able to fund our social 
priorities and encourage economic activity favoured by the tax system?
On 12 February 2013, the OECD published a G-20-inspired formative 
study entitled Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting85 (February Report). 
This exploratory document was the first substantive response to the perceived 
82. See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion, supra note 64; OECD, Action Plan, supra note 9.
83. See Wilkie, “Reflecting,” supra note 81; Wilkie, “Definition,” supra note 81. See also RM 
Bird & Scott Wilkie, “Tax Policy Objectives” in H Kerr, K McKenzie & J Mint, eds, Tax 
Policy in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 2012) 2.
84. GlaxoSmithKline, supra note 11 at para 50.
85. See OECD, Addressing Base Erosion, supra note 64. See also OECD, Hybrid Mismatch 
Arrangements: Tax Policy and Compliance Issues (2012), online: <www.oecd.org/tax/exchange-
of-tax-information/HYBRIDS_ENG_Final_October2012.pdf>; OECD, Aggressive Tax 
Planning based on After-Tax Hedging (2013), online: <www.oecd.org/ctp/aggressive/
after_tax_hedging_report.pdf>. For ongoing BEPS work that tackles the same or similar 
subjects, see OECD, Neutralising the Effects of Hybrid Mismatch Arrangements, OECD/
G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project (Paris: OECD, 2014), online: <dx.doi.
org/10.1787/9789264218819-en>.
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inadequacy of longstanding international tax jurisdiction conventions, rules, 
and customary practices underlying many countries’ “international tax law” to 
ascertain where business income is earned in a taxable way. The ongoing work of 
the OECD and the G-20 advanced by the February Report has quickly evolved to 
be formulated in the OECD’s Action Plan on Base Erosion (Action Plan) published 
in mid-July 2013.86 The G-20 countries had an opportunity to consider the 
Action Plan at their September meeting in St. Petersburg, where they endorsed 
it and affirmed the fiscal urgency underlying it. The February Report and the 
Action Plan are closely identified with populist criticism of some major global 
corporations that have organized themselves, within the limits of prevailing law 
as the OECD February Report and Action Plan seem to concede, so as to pay 
very little corporate income tax anywhere.
The global corporations would say, as the OECD (which, we are mindful, 
is the collection of its member countries’ tax and finance authorities) would 
seemingly acknowledge, that they are “playing by the rules”–operating within 
the law–the private law as well as accessory tax law. They would deny responsi-
bility for the fact that relevant countries’ laws imperfectly mesh in the absence 
of systematically harmonious private and public law. They would also assert, 
with some justification, that there is no normative expectation that countries’ 
laws should coincide or intersect in any particular way. Seeing the law, including 
the tax law, as the exponent of underlying social and economic policy choices, 
it is almost trite to observe that countries will have different priorities, and in 
that connection can be expected to mobilize their legal systems to support these 
priorities in ways that are not in principle constrained by other countries’ choices. 
As well, countries may not readily accept responsibility for perceived inadequa-
cies of prevailing “international tax law” (or their own domestic law in this 
connection), the foundations and antecedents of which are increasingly exposed 
by contemporary business practices, the infinite flexibility of legal fictions, and 
the tectonic interactions of countries’ tax and private laws.87
D. POSSIBLE RESPONSES
The starting point for civilized society is respect for the law. This proposition 
presumes the existence of law as the manifestation of social and economic policy 
imperatives we are meant to observe and choices we have collectively made. It 
presumes respect for order offered by the law rather than looser standards, as the 
86. See OECD, Action Plan, supra note 9.
87. For additional supporting commentary on related inadequacies in international 
tax law, see ibid.
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Guindon case well frames, that could entail serious extra-legal consequences. We 
are right to be concerned about whether our tax system can withstand interna-
tional incursions on its tax base. But we must think carefully about whether 
administrative action fostered by international collaborations among tax adminis-
trations–even if acknowledged to be salutary for the tax system, high minded in 
the most positive sense, just in social and economic policy terms, and proposed in 
good faith in relation to what is sometimes referred to as “soft law”88–is acceptable 
or sustainable without suitable legal validation.
Should our response be to sharpen our law by political and legislative 
consensus to align it more closely with just democratic principles that Neil 
consistently and forcefully argues should be empowered by the tax system? We 
might ask whether our response should be simply to enact the OECD Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines, as have some other countries, notably the United Kingdom 
and Australia. Even then there are perils with such an approach, possibly, in so 
far as tax law is much more that the visible statutory fiscal tip of a much larger 
private and public law iceberg; possibly simply giving supranational guidance 
a statutory home would still not be immune from criticism as incomplete law, 
because it would fail to capture the important private law relationships that 
enliven the tax law.89
What would Neil argue for? Enacting the OECD Guidelines into domestic 
tax law clearly is not impossible; other countries have taken such a path. But 
as noted earlier and again here, the law is more than the “tax law.” A socially 
just formulation of tax policy and its articulation in tax law seemingly depends, 
usually without much fanfare, on understanding and responding to all the various 
manifestations of private law (including property law, contract law, and legal 
procedure) as well as public, international, and constitutional law. We anticipate 
that Neil might take such an outlook–indeed, we think that he has taken such 
88. Soft law is a term used casually to refer to the adoption by way of administrative guidance 
of legal constructs associated with property law, contract law, and other law, to describe and 
suggest consequences akin to legal consequences for economic events and manifestations of 
value and “transfers” of that value even though the adopted legal constructions or, indeed, 
specific statutory provisions strictly may not apply with the suggested effects. It is common, 
for example, to refer to “intangibles” to subsume economic interests of various kinds that 
are not intellectual or any other kind of property in a legal sense. See, for example, ongoing 
examinations by the OECD referred to in notes 66, 67, and 85. For a discussion of issues 
in this regard, see also Allison Christians, “Hard Law, Soft Law, and International Taxation” 
(2007) 25:2 Wis Int’l LJ 325.
89. By way of explanation, see e.g. Wilkie, “Definition,” supra note 81 at 240-47. See also J 
Scott Wilkie, “Intangibles and Location Benefits (Customer Base)” (2014) 68:6&7 Bull Int’l 
Tax’n 352 at 359-60.
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an outlook in examining tax law critically throughout his career. The OECD’s 
present study of “intangibles” and inquiry into “base erosion” remind us that the 
tax system, operating within or at least with reference to the larger legal system, 
is neither self-defining nor an island.
In the same context, administrative developments are taking place that 
command similar retrospection. It is increasingly common for tax adminis-
trations, including the CRA, to collaborate systematically in the exchange of 
information, ostensibly under the authority of tax treaties and information 
exchange agreements, and otherwise to share tax administration experience.90 A 
recent innovative expression of this collaborative tendency is the OECD’s proposal 
Tax Inspectors Without Borders, seemingly directed to making the experience 
of established tax authorities broadly available to authorities of developing 
tax systems.91 Related to the OECD’s and the G-20 countries’ commitments 
to address base erosion and transfer pricing, guidance and proposed practices 
are evolving for sharing taxpayer information (including through automatic 
exchanges) and for transfer pricing documentation. These sorts of collabora-
tions among tax authorities including advances in the compilation of taxpayer 
information and its general availability on a common platform no doubt are 
seen to serve the interests of their members’ tax systems: to understand global 
circumstances affecting their taxpayers as well as the taxpayers themselves do and 
to have early, informed warning about circumstances bearing on the integrity of 
those tax systems, which they may wish to consider closely under their respective 
tax laws according to developing international best practices. They may also serve 
a greater good that many of us would readily associate with international social 
justice as Neil would espouse it.
All of that said, though, do these arrangements present legal process concerns, 
less obvious perhaps than those presented by Guindon, but no less important 
to evaluate in legal terms? Everyone concerned with the effective application 
of evolving international tax standards should be interested in this question. 
No matter how well-directed these standards may be, and even allowing for a 
sympathetic reaction to their evolution, the standards and related guidance could 
90. One important example is Canada’s participation in the Joint International Tax Shelter 
Information Centre, or JITSIC. Other well-known associations or gatherings of this nature 
in addition to Global Forums under the auspices of the OECD have included the Pacific 
Association of Tax Administrators and the Leeds Castle Group. For general commentary on 
related subjects, see Allison Christians, “Networks, Norms, and National Tax Policy” (2010) 
9:1 Wash U Global Stud L Rev 1; Allison Christians, “Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social 
Contract” (2009) 18:1 Minn J Int’l L 99.
91. OECD, Tax Inspectors Without Borders (2014).
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be destined to be and remain only aspirational unless legal systems are hospitable 
hosts. For example, what is the legal authority for the existence and influence 
of these administrative groups and for their activities (and for that matter the 
guidance that they formulate as tax principles in particular areas on which their 
collaborations are grounded), taking account of their possible effects on how a 
country’s tax law is applied to its taxpayers? Do those taxpayers effectively meet 
a composite tax authority in the guise of their own, whose outlook is formed by 
the approaches and institutional attitudes of other tax authorities to which the 
taxpayer does not have direct access through legal process and, indeed, of which 
the taxpayer may not even be aware?
In so far as information exchanges are concerned, presumably this authority 
is thought to be grounded in the various bilateral tax treaties between countries 
comprising these groups. Is it necessarily the case, though, that all of these tax 
treaties have the same or substantially similar terms, that those terms even if 
expressed in seemingly equivalent language have the same implications or 
meaning, or that they manifest the same limits on information exchange? Are 
these groups and their activities–the influence that they conceivably have on 
shaping the application of member countries’ tax law–readily observable? Is 
there a forum in which, or are there principles according to which, taxpayers 
may know about and test these influences as they try to understand and address 
how the tax law to which they know they are subject is being administered? Do 
these groups operate with sufficient resources to fully and rigorously consider 
the often very difficult comparative law analysis of tax systems necessary before 
any informed inferences can be drawn about the significance of one country’s 
law for the application of another’s, with due sensitivity to the implications of 
often very different underlying private law that inevitably affects the meaning of 
deceptively similar looking tax law? Additionally, it is not to be assumed that the 
tax and social policy choices underlying countries’ tax regimes are the same or 
even, necessarily, similar.
These considerations, as we noted at the outset, cut to the heart of what we 
mean by tax law. Tax law is more than “best practices” concerning its administra-
tion, even though they may be important as equally may be approaches in the 
international area that are at least sensitive to how other countries administer 
their laws. Nevertheless, we are ultimately concerned with law. We enact and 
enforce tax law on the platform of private and public law, to achieve certain 
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objectives associated with our collective national priorities and interests.92 We 
must be careful about absorbing the reactions of others about their, and our, tax 
systems to infuse our law and administrative practices and legal procedures that 
give the law “life” without understanding what underlying priorities animate each 
tax and legal system. This is not a situation in which behavioural notions–“best 
practices”–simply can be legislated as a substitute for thoughtful law thoughtfully 
expressed, even though those practices are essential to maintain, and sometimes 
restore, the dynamism of the law as it confronts situations–to note two, difficult 
facts and conflicting legal characterizations and the influence of other countries’ 
laws, as frequently it does in the international area–that may well not have been 
foreseen or foreseeable concerning our law.
We do not make any judgments about administrative arrangements except 
to note their importance to orderly legal systems and the good faith with which 
tax authorities contending with the same difficult questions as others affected 
by the law struggle to give effect to the law and taxpayers’ rights according to 
it. In fact, we understand their need and respect the interests of tax authorities 
to be able to administer the law with the same facility that taxpayers apply it. 
But in this article, we ask fundamental questions about the place of tax law 
within a legal system. We, and we presume everyone else, would agree on the 
need for adherence to a legal system as the starting point for having and giving 
effect to tax law.
V. BACK TO OUR THESIS
It may be that we would adopt the pragmatic approach to understanding and 
applying the tax law that grounds Neil’s merger of tax law and social justice. 
But the starting point is still the law. Sometimes, the law as legislated, even if 
interpreted with reasonable elasticity and attention to social context, may fall 
short of our objectives and aspirations for our tax system. Particularly, in the 
“compressed”93 world in which we live, where distance and time are no longer 
reliable qualitative, quantitative, or even temporal markers of economic activity, 
92. For example, Canada’s tax treaties typically contain “non-discrimination” articles, but, in 
fact, these articles systematically preserve Canada’s entitlement effectively to discriminate in 
the use of its tax system to provide economic benefits through the tax system to residents 
of Canada which non-residents of Canada are not meant to enjoy. See Richard Lewin & J 
Scott Wilkie, “Non-discrimination Rules in International Taxation” (1993) 78:b C de D 
Fisc Int’l 357.
93. See Wilkie, “Reflecting,” supra note 81 at 148; David Harvey, The Enigma of Capital and the 
Crises of Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) at 158.
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we confront regularly the shortcomings, vulnerability, and frailty of our tax 
and legal systems as they are matched against and must confront those of other 
countries and the ingenuity of taxpayers. As Guindon reminds us, tax law is still 
law, and the sanctions of the law must be clearly visible and the processes to give 
them effect transparent and fair.
We need to care for the tax system, recognizing that it is part of a legal 
system. We should cultivate the tax law to make it compatible with Canada’s 
domestic norms encapsulated by the rule of law. And when the quest for justice 
in the tax law, to which Neil Brooks has directed his career, points us in the 
direction of international norms, we should make sure that those norms are 
properly translated into domestic law according to the precepts and expecta-
tions of Canada’s legal system. Only in that way will taxpayers, tax officials, and 
Canadian courts all be safely reading from the same Canadian page.
